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Excessive and uncontrollable worry is a defining feature of Generalized Anxiety
Disorder (GAD). An important endeavor in the treatment of pathological worry is to
understand why some people are unable to stop worrying once they have started.
Worry perseveration is associated with a tendency to deploy goal-directed worry
rules (known as “as many as can” worry rules; AMA). These require attention to the
goal of the worry task and continuation of worry until the aims of the “worry bout”
are achieved. This study examined the association between the tendency to use
AMA worry rules and neural and autonomic responses to a perseverative cognition
induction. To differentiate processes underlying the AMA worry rule use from trait
worry, we also examined the relationship between scores on the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ) and neural and autonomic responses following the same
induction. We used resting-state functional magnetic resonance brain imaging (fMRI)
while measuring emotional bodily arousal from heart rate variability (where decreased
HRV indicates stress-related parasympathetic withdrawal) in 19 patients with GAD
and 21 control participants. Seed-based analyses were conducted to quantify brain
changes in functional connectivity (FC) with the amygdala. The tendency to adopt an
AMA worry rule was associated with validated measures of worry, anxiety, depression
and rumination. AMA worry rule endorsement predicted a stronger decrease in HRV
and was positively associated with increased connectivity between right amygdala
and locus coeruleus (LC), a brainstem noradrenergic projection nucleus. Higher
AMA scores were also associated with increased connectivity between amygdala
and rostral superior frontal gyrus. Higher PSWQ scores amplified decreases in FC
between right amygdala and subcallosal cortex, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, middle
frontal gyrus, and areas of parietal cortex. Our results identify neural mechanisms
underlying the deployment of AMA worry rules. We propose that the relationship
between AMA worry rules and increased connectivity between the amygdala and
prefrontal cortex (PFC) represents attempts by high worriers to maintain arousal and
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distress levels in order to feel prepared for future threats. Furthermore, we suggest
that neural mechanisms associated with the PSWQ represent effortful inhibitory control
during worry. These findings provide unique information about the neurobiological
processes that underpin worry perseveration.
Keywords: generalized anxiety disorder, perseverative cognition, amygdala, functional connectivity, worry stop
rules
INTRODUCTION
Worry is a cognitive activity experienced bymost individuals, but
for some this activity can become pathological, uncontrollable
and distressing, and lead to regular bouts of perseverative
cognition that negatively affects many forms of daily functioning.
Pathological worry of this kind is the cardinal diagnostic feature
of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD; DSM-5, American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), and is also an important
transdiagnostic process, which contributes to the symptoms
observed in a range of other psychopathologies (Barlow et al.,
2004; Ehring and Watkins, 2008).
A commonly cited approach to understanding worry has
conceptualized it as a strategy of cognitive avoidance in response
to threat (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 2004). Individuals with
GAD perceive the world as being a threatening place and one way
of managing physiological and psychological feelings of fear is
to anticipate what may happen in the future and try to prepare
oneself for them. From this perspective, worry is considered
as a mental attempt to solve problems (Sibrava and Borkovec,
2008). However, on amoremechanistic level, proximal models of
individual pathological worry have only recently been developed
(Hirsch and Mathews, 2012; Davey and Meeten, in press), and
will be required to understand the individual neurological and
psychological mechanisms that generate a worry experience
that is perseverative, seemingly uncontrollable, and increasingly
distressing as the bout continues.
There is a need to examine the psychological processes
that underlie pathological worry, and differentiate it from
non-clinical worry, in terms of autonomic and neurobiological
correlates of worry. One approach is to explore the goal-directed
rules that people use when worrying, to understand why some
people persevere with worry after others have stopped. For most
people, worrying has a purpose, whether it be to solve perceived
problems of daily living (Davey, 1994), as an attempt to repair
negative mood (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), or as a means to try
and ensure that ‘‘bad’’ things don’t happen or to avoid future
catastrophes (Davey et al., 1996; Breitholtz et al., 1998; Borkovec
et al., 1999; Wells, 2010). Worrying of this kind usually comes
with a set of implicit goal-directed rules that are deployed to
maximize goal attainment (Chaiken et al., 1989; Martin et al.,
1993). These rules don’t necessarily tell the worrier how to
achieve the goal, but they have a motivational influence by
stressing the importance of the goal and activating processes for
monitoring whether the goal has been achieved (Davey, 2006;
Davey and Meeten, in press).
The endorsement of goal-directed worry rules is highly
correlated with a variety of worry-relevant variables (Davey
et al., 2005), including measures of trait worry (as measured
by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ; Molina and
Borkovec, 1994) and beliefs about the positive consequences of
worry (as measured by the Consequences of Worry Scale; Davey
et al., 1996). Furthermore, the reported use of goal-directed rules
significantly predicts perseveration on behavioral measures of
catastrophic worrying (Davey et al., 2005).
A recent cognitive model of the perseverative worry bout
(Davey and Meeten, in press) describes how potential worries or
threats activate the pathological worrier’s positive beliefs about
a need to worry (Wells, 2007, 2010), and how these beliefs
are operationalized in the deployment of goal-directed rules for
worrying. Consequently, the pathological worrier ‘‘continues to
worry until he/she assesses that he/she will be able to effectively
cope with anticipated threat’’ (Wells, 2007, p.19). Identified
threats act to prime habitual goal-directed worry rules in an
automatic fashion (Bargh, 1989; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000),
and these same strict rules for completion of the worry bout also
directly contribute to perseveration (ensuring all eventualities are
considered).
In addition to psychological models of pathological worry,
there have been recent attempts to examine the neurological
and autonomic correlates of worry. Research has highlighted
specific autonomic, and neurobiological responses to worry,
and perseverative cognition including a number of somatic
reactions (Brosschot et al., 2006; Ottaviani et al., 2016a), one
of which is reduced heart rate variability (HRV). Reduction
in HRV is a recognized feature of worry and has been
shown to mirror cognitive and emotional inflexibility in worry
and rumination (Ottaviani et al., 2013, 2015). Borkovec and
Hu (1990) demonstrated that worry can reduce emotional
responding to a negative stressor (where worry is assumed to
function as a way of avoiding negative emotional states). Reduced
HRV can be seen as the physiological component of cognitive
perseveration (Thayer et al., 1996).
Brain imaging studies have shown reduced connectivity
between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC) in GAD
patients as compared to healthy controls (HC; Monk et al., 2008;
Roy et al., 2013). This pattern of aberrant connectivity between
amygdala and pre-frontal areas is associated with poor emotional
regulation (Borkovec et al., 2004; Banks et al., 2007; Hamm et al.,
2014).
The relationship between autonomic and neurobiological
signatures of pathological worry has recently been examined by
Makovac et al. (2016) where resting state functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques and physiological
recordings were combined to characterize the interplay between
psychological and physiological symptoms of worry. This study
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reinforced earlier findings of lower connectivity between the
right amygdala and pre-frontal areas (namely right superior
frontal gyrus, right paracingulate/anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) and right supramarginal gyrus) in individuals with GAD.
The study also highlighted shared neural correlates (centered on
amygdala connectivity) of worry and autonomic dysregulation
in GAD participants, which suggests a common mechanism
underlying affective and physiological symptomatology.
Aberrant connectivity between the amygdala and PFC is an
established resting state finding in high anxious populations,
however the functional differences between anxious and
non-anxious populations while engaging in a worry bout are less
well understood.
The purpose of the present study is to supplement this
knowledge of the role of the deployment of goal-directed rules
(i.e., ‘‘as many as can’’ (AMA) stop rules) in pathological
worrying. Functional changes in brain activity and autonomic
bodily responses (HRV) were measured following a perseverative
cognition induction and related to the use of goal-directed worry
stop rules. Further, we also report the relationship between
neural and autonomic responses following the perseverative
cognition induction and individual differences in the level
of trait worry (measured using the PSWQ; Meyer et al.,
1990). Together these approaches aimed to enhance our
understanding of pathological worrying by characterizing
associations between stop-rule deployment and functional brain
activity and autonomic arousal state.
It was hypothesized that:
1. AMA stop rules correlate with validated measures of worry,
anxiety and rumination.
2. Based on the finding that a perseverative cognition induction
resulted in increased connectivity between the amygdala and
PFC in GAD participants (Makovac et al., 2016), we predicted
that trait AMA stop-rule adoption is associated with a shift
towards increased connectivity between the amygdala and
PFC following the perseverative cognition induction.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One participant who did not complete the full experiment
was excluded and the final sample encompassed 19 patients
(17 women, 2 men; mean age = 29.58 (6.93) years) who
met diagnostic criteria for GAD and 21 HC (18 women,
3 men; mean age = 28.67 (9.45) years). Only one participant
was non-Caucasian. Patients and HC were recruited from
public advertisement. All participants were right-handed, native
English speakers, and had normal or corrected vision. Exclusion
criteria were: age below 18 years, past head injury or
neurological disorders, history of major medical or psychiatric
disorder (other than GAD and co-morbid depression in
the patients), cognitive impairment, history of substance or
alcohol abuse or dependance, heart disease, obesity (body
mass index >30 kg/m2), pregnancy, claustrophobia or other
MRI exclusions. Two GAD patients were included who took
long-term medication (1 Citalopram, 1 Pregabalin) at the time
of the study. All other participants were medication free. All
participants provided written informed consent. The study was
approved by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) with
local approval from the Brighton and Sussex Medical School
Research Governance and Ethics Committee. Participants were
compensated for their time.
Procedure
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) was
administered by a trained postdoctoral fellow (FM) to
patients and controls to confirm/exclude the diagnosis
of GAD. Participants then completed sociodemographic
and dispositional traits questionnaires. Participants were
subsequently familiarized with the neuroimaging environment,
connected to the physiological recording equipment, and then
underwent the MRI protocol.
Questionnaires
Worry Stop Rule Checklist
The Worry Stop Rule Checklist (Davey et al., 2005) is a measure
designed to assess trait stop rules, or specific beliefs used to
decide when to discontinue a worry bout or episode (Davey et al.,
2005). The measure consists of two subscales. The first scale
consists of 10 items measuring the degree to which individuals
endorse goal-directed or AMA stop rules while worrying (e.g.,
‘‘I must keep worrying about this, otherwise things won’t get
done properly’’). The second scale consists of 9-items that assess
the degree to which individuals use a ‘‘feel like continuing’’ (FL)
stop rule (e.g., ‘‘Stop worrying- in the long run this just won’t
matter very much’’). This measure has shown to have adequate
internal consistency (α = 0.82–0.88), and validity, as moderate
to strong correlations have been found between this measure
and the PSWQ (Davey et al., 2005, 2007; Turner and Wislon,
2010).
Penn State Worry Questionnaire
The PSWQ, (Meyer et al., 1990) is the most widely used valid
measure of the frequency and intensity of worry. The PSWQ
consists of 16-items (e.g., ‘‘Many situations make me worry’’),
which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) ‘‘not
at all typical of me’’ to (5) ‘‘very typical of me’’. The PSWQ has
good test-retest reliability (r = 74–0.93; Molina and Borkovec,
1994), internal consistency (α = 90; Brown et al., 1992), and
discriminant validity (Meyer et al., 1990).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y (STAI; Spielberger
et al., 1983) consists of two parts, each comprising 20 questions.
STAI-Y1 measures state anxiety, that is the respondent’s current
level of anxiety, by asking how they feel ‘‘right now’’, with a
four-point scale of responses from ‘‘not at all’’ to ‘‘very much
so’’ for statements such as ‘‘I am tense’’ and ‘‘I feel nervous’’.
STAI-Y2 measured trait anxiety, or differences in proneness
to anxiety, by asking how participants generally feel, with a
four-point scale from ‘‘almost never’’ to ‘‘almost always’’ for
statements such as ‘‘I feel like a failure’’ and ‘‘I have disturbing
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thoughts’’. Internal consistency coefficients for the scale have
ranged from 0.86 to 0.95; test-retest reliability coefficients have
ranged from 0.65 to 0.75 over a 2-month interval (Spielberger
et al., 1983).
Ruminative Responses Scale
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) is a subscale of the
Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow,
1991) consisting of 24 items, revealed as highly reliable and
valid in measuring reactions to experiencing negative emotions
(α = 0.92). Individuals must respond to a series of captions such
as ‘‘Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel’’ where
possible responses are ‘‘almost never/sometimes/often/almost
always’’.
Experimental Design
During scanning, participants underwent a series of four 5-min
resting state periods, each followed by a 6-min easy visuomotor
tracking task (described elsewhere; Ottaviani et al., 2016b).
During resting state periods participants were instructed to rest
with their eyes open without thinking of anything and not
falling asleep. After the second or third resting block, participants
underwent a recorded verbal induction procedure designed to
engender perseverative cognition:
‘‘Next I would like you to recall an episode that happened in the
past year that made you feel sad, anxious, or stressed or something
that may happen in the future that worries you. Then, I would
like you to think about this episode in detail, for example about
its possible causes, consequences, and your feelings about it. Please
keep thinking about this until the end of the next tracking task.
Thank you. Please take as much time as you need to recall the
episode and press the button whenever you are ready’’.
To assess state levels of perseverative cognition, at the end of
each resting-state period, participants rated their thoughts over
the preceding period.
The perseverative cognition induction has established efficacy
in eliciting worrisome thoughts that were reproduced in this
group (described Makovac et al., 2016).
Physiological Data Processing
Cardiac signal was collected using MRI-compatible finger pulse
oximetry (8600FO; Nonin Medical) recorded digitally (via
a CED power 1401, using Spike2 v7 software; Cambridge
Electronic., Design CED). Pulse data were manually checked
and corrected for artifacts. After extracting inter-beat intervals,
HRV was estimated by calculating the root mean square
successive difference (RMSSD) a reliable parameter for assessing
vagally-mediated HRV (Task Force of the European Society
of Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing and
Electrophysiology, 1996). RMSSD was derived using RHRV
4.0 analysis software1. Individual HRV estimates were obtained
for the duration of each resting state scanning period. Attention
was given to HRV measures before (Pre) and after (Post) the
perseverative cognition induction.
1http://rhrv.r-forge.r-project.org/
MRI Acquisition and Preprocessing
MRI images were acquired on a 1.5-Tesla Siemens Magnetom
Avanto scanner. Structural volumes were obtained using the
high-resolution three-dimension magnetization-prepared rapid
gradient-echo sequence (HiRes3DMPRAGE). Functional
datasets used T2∗weighted echoplanar imaging (EPI)
sensitive to blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
signal (TR = 2.52 s, TE = 43 ms, flip-angle (FA) = 90◦
34 slices, slice thickness = 3 mm; FOV = 192 mm, voxel size
3 mm× 3 mm× 3 mm).
Data were pre-processed using Statistical ParametricMapping
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience; SPM82), and
in-house software implemented in Matlab (The Mathworks
Inc, Natick, MA, USA). For each participant, the first four
volumes of the fMRI series were discarded to allow for
T1 equilibration effects. The pre-processing steps included
correction for head motion, compensation for slice-dependent
time shifts, normalization to the EPI template in standard space
(MNI) coordinates provided with SPM8, and smoothing with
a3D Gaussian Kernel with 8 mm3 full-width at half maximum.
The global temporal drift was removed using a 3rd order
polynomial fit. To remove other potential sources of bias,
data was further filtered regressing against the realignment
parameters, and the signal averaged over whole brain voxels.
Then, all images were filtered by a phase-insensitive band-
pass filter (pass band 0.01–0.08 Hz) to reduce the effect
of low frequency drift and high frequency physiological
noise.
Statistical Analyses
Questionnaire, Behavioral, and HRV Analyses
All data are expressed as means (±SD). Differences at
p ≤ 0.05 are regarded as significant unless corrections for
multiple comparisons are stated. Data analysis was performed
with SPSS 22.0 for Windows (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Pearson’s r correlations were conducted to test for associations
between worry stop-rules (AMA and FL) and validated
questionnaire measures of worry, anxiety, depression and
rumination.
Seed-Based fMRI Analysis
Given the organization of the brain into functional networks,
functional connectivity (FC) is a valuable tool as it measures
inter-regional synchrony of low frequency fluctuations in BOLD
fMRI (Biswal et al., 1995; Fox et al., 2005). In the present study,
we used seed-based analyses as our approach was hypothesis-
driven.
Anatomical ROIs were constructed using an anatomical
toolbox in SPM (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) for bilateral
amygdala. The average resting state fMRI time-series over the
ROIs were extracted for GAD and HC groups. These time series
were then used as a regressor in a 1st level SPM analysis.
A correlational analysis was then carried out between the
difference in FC after the perseverative cognition induction
2http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
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(∆ = post − pre-induction) and AMA, FL and PSWQ scores,
using a t-test with Group (GAD, HC) as main factor and AMA,
FL and PSWQ scores as variables of interest.
RESULTS
There were no significant group differences for any of the
assessed socio-demographic and lifestyle variables (see Makovac
et al., 2016).
Questionnaires
The GAD group had significantly higher scores on the Worry
Stop Rule Checklist ‘‘AMA’’ scale [GAD; M = 36.28, SD = 5.62,
HC;M = 22.57, SD = 5.42, t(38) = 7.35, p =< 0.001, r = 0.77] and
significantly lower scores on the ‘‘FL’’ scale, as compared to the
HC group [GAD;M = 18.56, SD = 6.24, HC;M = 29.10, SD = 9.21,
t (38) = 4.19, p = < 0.001, r = 0.56]. The GAD group also had
significantly higher scores on the PSWQ, the STAI, and the RRS
and significantly lower HRV than the HC group (see Makovac
et al., 2016).
Correlation analysis was performed to examine the
relationship between the Worry Stop Rule Checklist and
validated trait measures of worry, rumination and anxiety (see
Table 1). An accepted significance level p = 0.01 was used in
correction for multiple comparisons. The AMA stop rule scale
was significantly positively correlated with the PSWQ, the
STAI-Y2 and RRS and the FL scale was significantly negatively
correlated with the PSWQ and the STAI-Y2 measures, and
shows a trend to negative correlation with RRS.
Heart Rate Variability (HRV)
HRV showed a significant reduction following the perseverative
cognition induction. Change scores (post − pre) were negatively
correlated with AMA stop rules, r = −0.45, p = 0.004 and
positively correlated with FL stop rules, r = 0.40, p = 0.01. There
was no significant relationship between PSWQ and pre to post
induction change in HRV, r =−0.27, p = 0.09.
Correlation Between Pre- to
Post-Induction Changes in Amygdala
Functional Connectivity and Scores on the
Worry Stop Rule Checklist
A positive correlation was obtained between AMA score and pre-
to post-induction changes in FC [∆ = post − pre-induction]
TABLE 1 | Pearson’s r correlations between worry rules as measured by
the Stop Rule Checklist and trait measures of worry (Penn State Worry
Questionnaire, PSWQ), anxiety (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form, STAI),
and rumination (Ruminative Response Scale, RRS).
Questionnaires AMA
stop rule
FL stop
rule
PSWQ STAI-Y2 RRS
AMA stop rule – −0.626∗∗ 0.686∗∗ 0.703∗∗ 0.491∗∗
FL stop rule −0.626∗∗ – −0.633∗∗ −0.595∗∗ −0.328∗
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p ≤ 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Correlations between pre- to post-induction changes in
amygdala functional connectivity (FC) and scores on the “as many as
can” (AMA) subscale of the Stop Rule Checklist and PSWQ and
significant interaction effects when both measures are simultaneously
entered into the model.
Brain region Cluster Voxel
Side k p FWE Z MNI xyz
Positive correlation with AMA
Right amygdala seed
Locus coeruleus R 374 0.004 4.31 −8 −28 −18
Left amygdala seed
Superior frontal gyrus L 983 0.000 4.32 −8 36 56
R 4.02 8 38 56
Middle frontal gyrus R 3.69 36 34 48
Negative correlation with PSWQ
Right amygdala seed
Lateral occipital cortex R 1311 0.000 5.16 40 −78 26
Precuneus R 4.53 20 −64 32
Precentral gyrus R 608 0.000 4.56 56 −2 22
L 559 0.000 4.35 −56 6 38
Middle frontal gyrus R 353 0.000 3.79 34 −2 46
Left amygdala seed
Inferior frontal gyrus L 820 0.000 5.23 −56 12 26
Lateral occipital cortex R 859 0.000 4.19 40 −78 24
Angular gyrus R 4.00 44 −50 32
AMA × PSWQ interaction
Right amygdala seed
Superior frontal gyrus R 525 0.000 4.42 10 40 56
Middle frontal gyrus L 3.53 −32 30 50
R 3.18 38 32 48
Anterior cingulate cortex R 237 0.051 3.98 16 −4 40
Left amygdala seed
Superior frontal gyrus R 751 0.000 4.33 10 42 56
L 4.03 −22 40 50
Middle frontal gyrus R 3.76 36 36 48
between right amygdala and locus coeruleus (LC), a brainstem
(pons) center for noradrenergic projections up and down the
neuraxis (Table 2). Similarly, a positive correlation was observed
between AMA score and ∆ FC between left amygdala and
superior frontal gyrus. Thus, higher AMA scores predicted a
stronger increase in FC (i.e., higher ∆ FC values) between
amygdala and LC and superior frontal gyrus, respectively (see
Figure 1).
Correlation Between Pre- to
Post-Induction Changes in Amygdala
Functional Connectivity and Scores on the
Penn State Worry Questionnaire
A negative correlation was obtained between scores on
the PSWQ and the change in FC between right amygdala
and lateral occipital cortex, precentral gyrus and middle
frontal gyrus and between PSWQ score and the change in
FC between left amygdala and lateral occipital cortex and
inferior frontal gyrus (for a complete list of brain areas, see
Table 2). Higher PSWQ scores predicted a stronger decrease in
amygdala FC with these areas from pre- to post-induction (see
Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Correlations between pre- to post-induction changes
[∆ = post − pre-induction] in amygdala functional connectivity (FC) and “as
many as can” (AMA) and trait worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire [PSWQ])
scores. Positive correlations are represented with blue dashed lines and
indicate that higher AMA scores were associated with stronger FC increases
following the perseverative cognition induction; negative correlations are
represented with a green dashed line and indicate that higher scores on the
PSWQ were associated with stronger decreases in amygdala FC following the
perseverative cognition induction. (B) Significant AMA × PSWQ interactions
when scores on both questionnaires were simultaneously entered in the
model.
AMA × PSWQ Interaction
When both AMA and PSWQ were simultaneously entered
in the regression model, the above mentioned amygdala
connectivity patterns did not change. Moreover, a significant
AMA × PSWQ interaction emerged for the FC between the
bilateral amygdala and areas of the middle frontal gyrus,
bilaterally. A significant AMA× PSWQ interaction also emerged
for the FC between the right amygdala and the ACC. In detail,
higher scores on the PSWQ were associated with decreased
amygdala FC with these areas, whereas higher scores on
AMA were associated with increased amygdala connectivity
following the perseverative cognition induction (see Table 2 and
Figure 1).
DISCUSSION
A recent model conceptualizes AMA goal-directed worry stop
rules within an integrated network of behavioral and cognitive
responses that occur during perseverative worry (Davey and
Meeten, in press). A key aim of the present article was to
extend our knowledge of perseverative worry more generally,
and goal directed worry rules specifically, by examining the
neurobiological processes that are related to AMA stop rule use
and compare this with processes associated with a measure of
trait worry (PSWQ) after a perseverative cognition induction.
We examined responses to the Worry Stop Rule Checklist
(Davey et al., 2005) by individuals with GAD as compared to
the HC group. The GAD group scored significantly higher on
the AMA subscale and significantly lower on the FL subscale
than the HC group. The AMA subscale was also significantly
positively correlated with validated measures of trait worry,
anxiety and rumination. To our knowledge, this is the first
time that the Worry Stop Rule Checklist has been completed
by individuals with GAD. The present findings are consistent
with previous research, which has shown that in a non-clinical
sample, the tendency to adopt an AMA approach to worrying
was positively associated with higher PSWQ scores and beliefs
about positive and negative consequences of worry (Davey et al.,
2005). Furthermore, previous research has shown that, over the
course of a catastrophic worry task, individuals have a tendency
to shift from endorsing AMA stop rules at the outset of the
task, to FL rules at the end of the task (Davey et al., 2007).
This suggests that FL stop rules are associated with cessation of
worry.
Using seed-based fMRI analysis, we found that GAD
participants with high AMA worry rule endorsement displayed
larger decreases in HRV after a perseverative cognition
induction and also displayed increased connectivity between
right amygdala and brainstem. Higher AMA scores were
also coupled to increased connectivity between amygdala and
rostral superior frontal gyrus. In contrast, higher PSWQ scores
were associated with stronger post induction decreases in
FC between right amygdala and more ventral and lateral
frontal regions (subcallosal cortex, bilateral inferior frontal
gyrus).
The AMA worry rules and PSWQ shared a representation
within the middle frontal gyrus, a region implicated as part
of the cognitive regulation network (e.g., effortful regulation
of affect), where activity is typically inversely correlated with
spontaneous activity in the amygdala (Roy et al., 2009).
Interestingly, we observed that lower scores on the PSWQ were
associated with increased amygdala FC with this area during the
perseverative cognition induction (i.e., a negative correlation),
whereas higher scores for AMA were associated with increased
amygdala connectivity (i.e., a positive correlation). Previous
research has shown that increased connectivity between the
right amygdala and left middle frontal gyrus is observed during
threatening scenarios (Gold et al., 2015). Similarly, in the
induction of worry in elderly patients with GAD, participants
displayed enhanced connectivity between the paraventricular
nucleus seed and middle frontal gyrus (Andreescu et al.,
2015). Moreover, decreased amygdala FC with the middle
frontal gyrus is observed after emotion regulation training (Li
et al., 2016). Thus our findings enhance a growing literature
concerning the contribution of middle frontal gyrus to affective
regulation.
In the present study, we report that as an individual’s
worry score (PSWQ) decreased, the perseverative cognition
induction produced a greater increase in FC between the
amygdala and the middle frontal gyrus. Makovac et al. (2016)
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reported that a HC group consistently displayed greater
connectivity between the right amygdala and frontal pole
regions (right superior frontal gyrus) compared to GAD
patients. One possibility is that the present findings reflect
attempts at effective top-down control of the amygdala
where low anxious individuals may curb a worry bout
through emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal
(e.g., Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Furthermore, connectivity
between the amygdala and PFC has predicted lower levels
of anxiety and effective emotional regulation (Kim et al.,
2011).
In the present study, findings concerning trait worry (as
examined by the PSWQ) support previous research findings
in a GAD population (Hilbert et al., 2014). However, we
propose that the AMA stop rule endorsement captures a different
aspect of worry, which relates to the perseverative nature of
pathological worry. For example, high anxious individuals have
been shown to consider worry as a useful strategy to cope
with threat and catastrophic worriers endorse positive beliefs
about worry (Wells, 2004). We propose that the association
between AMA stop rule endorsement and increased connectivity
between the amygdala and middle frontal gyrus may capture
successful attempts by the worrier to maintain chronic arousal
and feelings of distress. For example, the contrast avoidance
model of worry proposes that worry is reinforced because
pathological worriers prefer to feel chronically distressed in
order to prepare for the worst outcome (Newman and Llera,
2011). In high anxious individuals, a chronic state of cognitive
and physiological readiness to deal with threat (e.g., worry
perseveration) means that they avoid a potential future shift from
a positive or benign mental state to a negative one (Newman and
Llera, 2011).
Higher PSWQ scores were also uniquely associated with
diminished pre- to post-induction connectivity of amygdala with
the inferior frontal gyrus and the occipital cortex. Aberrant FC
between these areas is implicated in functional impairments
in socioemotional learning, anxiety, and self-referential insight
(e.g., Singh et al., 2015). For example, exaggerated negative
connectivity with lateral occipital cortex occurs in patients
with social anxiety disorder (Pannekoek et al., 2013). The
inferior frontal gyrus is also reported to show increased
connectivity with the right amygdala during anxiety regulation
engaged during threat exposure (Gold et al., 2015), consistent
with a role in inhibitory control to cope with elevated task
demands. Similarly, activation of lateral PFC with simultaneous
attenuation of amygdala activity is reported during cognitive
control of anxiety states from threat-related distractors and
reappraisal of threat stimuli (for a meta-analysis see Buhle et al.,
2014).
The pattern of results reported is consistent with a model
of pathological worrying in which chronic worriers attempt
to inhibit representations of the potential bad outcomes
associated with the worry, while simultaneously maintaining
arousal in order to seek out potential solutions to the issues
raised by the worry. Thus, as a measure of the pathological
frequency of worry, the PSWQ is not only associated with
the deployment of AMA worry rules (to facilitate the finding
of solutions to the worry through an internal narrative
process), but also with attempts to inhibit threatening images
of the potential worry entering conscious awareness. This
latter process is consistent with the avoidance model of worry
proposed by Borkovec et al. (2004) in which worry reflects
a process of effortful inhibitory control of the fearful images
associated with the worry, and this effect is implied by the
relationship between PSWQ scores and diminished pre- to
post-induction connectivity of amygdala with the inferior frontal
gyrus and the occipital cortex. In contrast, the deployment
of AMA worry rules is associated with increased connectivity
between the right amygdala and the LC, which is the major
noradrenergic nucleus of the brain and plays a central role in
the regulation of arousal and autonomic activity. This finding
supports the view that the deployment of AMA worry rules
operationalizes a strategy to remain in a state of arousal
reflecting preparedness for future negative outcomes and the
need to persevere with worry in order to seek solutions
for the worry. This is consistent with the contrast-avoidance
model of worry that proposes that worry is reinforced because
pathological worriers prefer to feel chronically distressed in
order to prepare for the worst outcome. This also means that
they avoid a potential future shift from a positive or benign
mental state to a negative one (Newman and Llera, 2011).
In addition, this interpretation is supported by the relevant
physiological data showing that HRV exhibited significant
reduction following the perseverative cognition induction, and
HRV change scores were negatively correlated with AMA worry
rule scores.
When both AMA and PSWQ are simultaneously entered in
the model, the above-examined inverse amygdala connectivity
patterns do not change, with the exception of a further
relation between the right amygdala and the ACC that was
positive for AMA and negative for PSWQ. The ACC is
involved in the regulation of negative affect via its connections
to the amygdala and the outflow to the autonomic system
(reviewed in Bush et al., 2000; Lavin et al., 2013). A
negative covariation between the amygdala and ACC in
fear perception reflects reduced amygdala responses with
greater ACC activity that is efficient top-down modulation
of the amygdala (e.g., Das et al., 2005). Again, results
are in agreement with scores on the PWSQ mirroring
inhibitory control of fear and scores on AMA stop rules
reflecting the proactive maintenance of fear, as indicated by
greater ACC activity accompanied by enhanced amygdala
activation.
In conclusion, we report that endorsement of AMA goal
directed worry rules is associated with neural and autonomic
responses to a perseverative cognition induction which can be
characterized as an attempt to maintain a state of cognitive and
physiological readiness for potential future feared outcomes. In
contrast the PSWQ captures attempts to inhibit or avoid intrusive
negative thoughts (Borkovec and Roemer, 1995). This is, to our
knowledge, the first time that goal directed worry rules have been
explored at a neurological level. Gaining a greater understanding
about the psychological and physiological processes that drive
worry perseveration will enable the development of more specific
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 November 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 553
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treatment approaches, which focus on factors that are likely to
drive the excessive perseveration of worry that is reported in
common psychopathologies such as GAD.
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